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The current corporate strategy of buying and selling
companies as a means of producing a profit has caused
serious problems in the economy. Diversification is partially
responsible for the evident neglect of individual firms and
specific industries. Productivity in these unattended firms
and industries continues to decline. Several American in-
dustries are no longer effectively competing with foreign im-
ports. Lack of productivity and increased foreign
competition in combination with the recession of the 1980's
has resulted in increased unemployment, the flight of capi-
tal to areas where inexpensive labor is available, and the
lack of economic development in America.
Faced with these predicaments, organized labor en-
counters serious challenges. Unionists are wrestling with
a variety of strategies with which to meet these difficulties:
2
retarding capital mobility and preventing shutdowns by ac-
quiring control over pension funds, lobbying for plant clos-
ing prenotification, 3 and advocating the use of eminent
domain by communities.4 Some unions have lobbied for
protectionist measures. Several are beginning to organize
workers in other countries. And while some unions advo-
cate converting plants in declining or unprofitable business-
es to other product lines, a few unionists advocate
subsidizing or nationalizing unprofitable businesses. None
of these strategies have so far been more than occasional-
ly successful.5
As experience demonstrates the weakness of tradition-
al economic strategies, labor has become far more cons-
cious of the need to find new strategies. Unions are aware
that collective bargaining is a troubled institution and un-
derstand that techniques traditionally used to bring collec-
tive bargaining to unwilling employers, including economic
pressure and government regulation, have lost much of their
potency.6
Worker ownership is one strategy unions are exploring
as a way to gain some control over capital and anchor it
in communities. Worker ownership can be effective in as-
sisting local communities to create, retain and improve
jobs.7 Thus, unionists should include worker ownership as
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a tactic in the general struggle for economic reform.8
However, labor's traditional skepticism of worker owner-
ship has hindered employee ownership of business. Form-
er President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
Samuel Gompers' early endorsement of collective bargain-
ing as the basis for the labor movement over the co-existent
policy of cooperatively owned businesses has impeded ac-
tive union involvement in this area.' The past struggle be-
tween ideologies within the labor movement should not be
repeated with the victor allowed to suppress employee
ownership as an effective tactic.
In order for worker owned companies to survive as
profitable businesses and worker ownership to be an ef-
fective tool in revitalizing the economy, the intimate as-
sistance of labor organizations, the community, and
government is required. The worker owned company will
look to these entities for leadership, funding, and technical
assistance.
This paper examines the role unions can play in eco-
nomic development through worker ownership. Following
a discussion of the internal ideological struggle within the
labor movement, the paper describes in detail the trans-
formation of a single company, Rath Packing Company,
to an employee owned company. Although several unions
have undertaken many worker ownership projects," the les-
sons learned from the union's participation in Rath, includ-
ing both the mistakes made and successes achieved, are
indicative of problems with past projects and can serve as
a guide for future attempts. Unions are assisting workers
to become owners and, at the same time, are creating new
roles for themselves. Although the actual methods utilized
to gain ownership of capital and secure control vary, three
principal vehicles exist:" employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs),2 worker cooperatives,'13 and, what I term, crea-
tive collective bargaining. 4 Although some unions are tak-
ing the offense in hostile takeover bids by becoming players
in the highly technical and competitive world of corporate
takeovers and reorganizations," I will not address this issue.
An equally important part of my discussion will focus
on the necessity for substantial union involvement during
negotiations and a solid, continuous union presence once
employee ownership is established. It is imperative that wor-
ker representatives are present to ensure workers' rights and
benefits during and after negotiations. Moreover, I believe
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the opportunity to democratize corporate institutions is not
only ripe but the more significant goal.1 6
The involvement of unions in employee ownership
raises numerous legal questions involving a myriad of cor-
porate law, finance, and labor law issues. The paper will
address the following two complex legal questions. First
is the potential conflict of interest when union officials sit
on boards of companies which in turn raises several dis-
tinct issues, namely, the conflicting fiduciary responsibili-
ties of corporate directors and union officials; the issue of
union involvement and employer domination and the is-
sue of union representatives' duty of fair representation un-
der the National Labor Relations Act; union officers' access
to and disclosure of information; and, the potential antitrust
and competition problems that arise. Second is the ques-
tion whether pension funds can be used to assist employee
ownership. Unions have had to learn to arrange financing;
they are often prevented from proceeding due to a short-
age of capital. The use of pension funds to finance projects
can be useful in strengthening employee ownership as a
strategy for economic reform.
Although the law is inconclusive in these areas and
there are obstacles, the law should not discourage employee
ownership and control in a situation which makes finan-
cial sense to both the company and the employees.
Moreover, these obstacles should not prevent labor organi-
zations from forging the way to economic redevelopment
and revitalization.
II. LABOR'S TRADITIONAL
VIEW OF WORKER OWNERSHIP
The American labor movement has been shaped by
the struggle between two diametric ideologies: the defense
of the union's position in the capitalist system and the desire
to change the system. The strong possibility for a reoccur-
rence of this ideological rift merits a reassessment of the
events leading to the original division.
During the late 1860's, William Sylvis, an avid believer
in trade unionism, pronounced his disillusionment with the
trade union movement He concluded that "there are a num-
ber of grievances ... that cannot be reached or removed
by trade unions ... No permanent reform can ever be es-
tablished through the agency of trade unions... 71' His
major complaint against trade unionism was with the in-
effectiveness of the strike, evidenced by the defeat of the
Iron Molders' International Union. 8
Sylvis espoused the philosophy of cooperation to cor-
rect basic flaws in the economy. 9 He believed cooperation
would eradicate class conflict by eliminating the wage sys-
tem; he envisioned a better social order created by the labor-
ing class. 20 His efforts materialized into the establishment
of several cooperative foundries during the post-Civil War
depression. In the early part of 1868, eight shops were oper-
ating successfully, four were ready to open, and twenty were
in various stages of organization.2 Moreover, Sylvis per-
suaded the International Union to assume control of a
cooperative foundry in Pittsburgh.
The entire labor and social reform effort was affected
by the cooperative movement and popular public interest
was awakened. The National Labor Union endorsed the
movement as "one of the most powerful agents for the ele-
vation of labor and the equitable distribution of wealth: 22
However, this favorable impression was blackened by the
financial demise of the Pittsburgh foundry. Workers were
either reluctant or unable to purchase stock, and creditors
were unwilling to support the struggling foundry. Faced with
severe financial difficulties and unable to secure sufficient
capital, the local union turned to the International for sup-
port. Unfortunately, the International branded as illegal the
transfer of strike pay to the cooperative 3 The culmination
of these factors resulted in the closing of the Pittsburgh
foundry and the beginning of the end of Sylvis' inspired
cooperative movement.
By the 1880's, the various factions of the labor move-
ment were polarized along ideological lines. The Knights
of Labor, descendant of the National Labor Union, adopt-
ed the policy and historical legacy of reform unionism and
maintained that only the basic transformation of the struc-
ture of society could solve the difficulties of the working
class. 24 Meanwhile, the renewed trade union movement con-
tested social reconstruction. It looked instead toward im-
mediate material improvements within the framework of
the existing institutions and relied essentially on economic
action.2"
While the Knights of Labor continued to perpetuate
the reform tradition of American labor, the leaders of the
trade unions began institutionalizing the collective bargain-
ing process. Around the turn of the 20th century, trade un-
ions, through the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
prevailed over the Knights of Labor.26 Essentially, the
productive power of the capitalist system was accepted by
organized labor, and labor leaders sought to guarantee the
rights of workers within the existing system rather than seek
to change it. This strategy entailed a substantial narrow-
ing of the aims of the labor movement. The division be-
tween labor and management was accepted; management
defined unions as representatives of a particular interest
within the firm. Self-management and worker ownership
consequently disappeared from labor's agenda. President
of the AFL, Samuel Gompers, drew the line conclusively
while endorsing the doctrine of "pure and simple unionism':
Collective bargaining in industry does not im-
ply that wage earners shall assume control of
industry, or responsibility for financial manage-
ment. It proposes that employees shall have the
right to organize and to deal with the employer
through selected representatives as to wages
and working conditions... [T]here is no belief
held in the trade unions that its members shall




Although there have been important subsequent de-
velopments in the labor movement since 1920, the strate-
gy constructed by the AFL has not been significantly
modified. The "pure and simple unionism" doctrine under-
lies the current body of labor law, labor relations theory,
and the interaction between employers, unions, and em-
ployees.
Under the National Labor Relations Act,28 employers
and unions have a duty2 9 to "bargain collectively ... subject
to the provisions of section 9(a)" Section 9(a) declares that
the union shall be the exclusive spokesperson "in respect
to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of work °30 Consequently, a remarkable amount of
time has been devoted to interpreting section 9(a), in ef-
fect defining mandatory and permissive subjects of bargain-
ing. Most important to the distinction between mandatory
and permissive subjects of bargaining is the conception of
managerial prerogatives. As a result, workers' rights and
the quality of working conditions and the unions' protec-
tion have been severely restricted. Workers' interests are
demarcated from managerial interests and further distin-
guished from the abstract interests of the enterprise. This
conviction is precisely captured by Justice Blackmun in First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB:3 1
Management must be free from the constraints
of the bargaining process to the extent essen-
tial for the running of a profitable business. It
also must have some degree of certainty before-
hand as to when it may proceed to reach deci-
sions without fear of later evaluations labeling
its conduct an unfair labor practice. Congress
did not explicitly state what issues of mutual
concern to union and management it intended
to exclude from mandatory bargaining.
Nonetheless, in view of an employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over
management decisions that have a substantial
impact on the continued availability of employ-
ment should be required only if the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collec-
tive bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business ...
Thus, self-management and worker ownership have been
legally removed from labor's agenda as well.
III. THE REEMERGENCE OF THE
COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT
Since the early 1970's, issues of worker ownership and
control have resurfaced. Organized labor has reacted with
ambivalence, if not resistance, to the growth in worker
ownership of businesses. According to a 1977 report,32 a
substantial number of union officials expressed skepticism
about employee ownership and its implications for labor.
A frequent source of skepticism was the impact of employee
ownership on collective bargaining. It was viewed as hav-
ing a potentially negative impact by eliminating the neces-
sary conflict of interest and aligning worker interests with
managerial ones. One unionist anticipated that "under such
circumstances, labor's traditional function(s) in this econo-
my are changed dramatically if not eliminated " 33
Today while there is lingering skepticism, nine percent
of the private sector workforce (nine million workers) now
participate in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs),
with additional workers involved in other forms of owner-
ship or management participation. 34 Currently, substantial
tax benefits exist for ESOPs.31 Some states have passed
laws adopting the legal structure of the successful indus-
trial cooperatives of Mondragon, Spain, facilitating the es-
tablishment of worker cooperatives.36 Many state
governments now also have programs to support worker
ownership.37
Some unions have taken the initiative and are leading
the way in the development of worker ownership as a strate-
gy.38 Organized labor can ill afford to ignore the increase
in number and complexity of worker ownership transac-
tions, especially when coupled with decreasing union mem-
bership. With caution and a critical perspective, unions can
use worker ownership positively as one ingredient in a mix
of capital strategies.3 9
IV. THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF
THE RATH PACKING COMPANY
A critical perspective is necessary in order for worker
ownership to have a positive influence on workers, the labor
movement and overall economic reform. The demise of
Rath Packing Company ("Rath") is one example from which
to learn. Rath was mismanaged to the brink of collapse
and the city of Waterloo, Iowa was in danger of losing one
of its major employers. The union local, facing the poten-
tial loss of its primary workplace, attempted to gain some
degree of control over its future. As a result, Rath Packing
Company was one of the first industrial plants to be wor-
ker owned and controlled.4"
In the 1940's Rath was considered one of the most
modem meatpackers in the industry.4' During the 1950's
and 1960's, management failed to make several strategic
moves: they missed the opportunity to market pork
products in the supermarkets, believing "mom & pop" stores
would continue to dominate the market, and they decided
not to reinvest in modem machinery and new processes.42
In addition, in the 1970's, the Nixon administration's price
controls were applied to Rath's products, but not to livestock
prices.43 Labor-management disputes were also common
throughout this period.44 During the late 1970's, public loans
and guarantees helped Rath remain viable. At the same
time, United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union ("UFCW) Local 46 was, in effect, granting the com-
pany loans by agreeing to defer company pension fund pay-
ments. 45 In 1978, management asked Local 46, which
represented most employees, to take a 50 percent wage
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cut, to give up one week of vacation and to delay a cost-
of-living pay increase. The union rejected this proposal.
Rath was the second largest employer in Black Hawk
County, Iowa, and the prospect of plant closure was an
ominous prospect to the people in the county. In response,
the community initiated action to channel short term funds
to Rath, and to study the intermediate and longer term
needs and potential for the firm. The Black Hawk County
Economic Development Committee assembled a Rath
Study Committee made up of representatives from the un-
ion, Rath, and local and regional public and private organi-
zations.47 The committee received a U.S. Department of
Commerce Economic Development Administration grant
to commission a consultant's study of options for saving
the company. The study recommended several major
changes: the infusion of capital, the reorganization of the
sales force, and the tightening up of labor practices and
operational procedures.48 However, the competitive life ex-
pectancy of the Waterloo plant was estimated to be only
three to five years, after which it would again be an un-
profitable enterprise.49
The next year, 1979, Rath Packing was saved from
bankruptcy when Lyle Taylor, president of Meat Cutter Lo-
cal 46, proposed, independently from International head-
quarters, that union employees purchase a controlling
interest in the company. The employees took wage cuts
and deferred benefits in return for 60 percent of the com-
pany's treasury stock."0 These actions provided the neces-
sary new equity to leverage a HUD-UDAG loan;
consequently, Black Hawk County and the City of Water-
loo were able to lend Rath $4,500,000 for capital invest-
ment from this federal grant. Rath also received $3 million
from the Economic Development Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce.' This infusion of capital
prevented outside investors, interested in making substan-
tial cuts in employee wages and fringe benefits, from gain-
ing control of the firm.
Rath also agreed to a profit sharing plan, through which
50 percent of future pre-tax profits were to be used to re-
store funding to the pension plan and pay employees
deferred wages and benefits.5 2 Furthermore, the acceptance
of the above agreement was conditioned upon elections for
a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and new directors to
replace existing directors on the Board of Directors.5 3 The
union chose ten new Board directors, three of whom were
rank and file activists and seven of whom were chosen for
their professional, business and political affiliations.5 4 The
Local Agreement throughout maintained the basic features
of the nationally negotiated labor-management Master
Agreement.-5
To effectuate the transfer of 60 percent of the stock
negotiated in exchange for the wage and benefit cuts, Rath
attempted to develop a non-ESOP perpetual stock trust.5 6
The approval of the Department of Labor (DOL) is required
before such a trust may be established. DOL, however,
would not give a "prohibited transaction exemption 57 be-
cause the employees were buying more than 10 percent of
the stock and holding it in trust.5 8 In June 1980, single em-
ployees elected to make individual stock purchases while
awaiting the establishment of a trust.5 9 Unable to secure
DOEs approval, Rath pursued the establishment of an Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).60 On January 1,
1981, the DOL accepted Rath's ESOP. Local 46, represent-
ing workers' interests, assisted in the drafting of the plan.
Local 46 then presented the plan to the employees as a
means of saving jobs, limiting concessions, gaining con-
trol of the company and management decisionmaking, pro-
tecting the pension plan, and preventing a proposed
buy-out.6 Employees independently elected to put their
stock into the Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT).62
Since some employees who had purchased stock individu-
ally chose not to contribute that stock to the ESOT, the
ESOT had only 49.5 percent of the total stock of the com-
pany rather than the anticipated 60 percent.63 The ESOT
held 1.8 million shares of employee-owned stock; Rath's
other 1.2 million shares remained publicly owned.
Rath established a 'two-tiered" or "instructed trusted'
model. Under this system, the ESOP Board of Trustees ex-
ercised the voting rights of all shares held in the ESOP
rather than passing the votes through the trust directly to
the employees. The employees 64 voted democratically on
all shareholder issues (the "first tier) and then required the
trustees to vote (the "second tier") in accordance with the
results of the employee voting.65 The ESOT Board of
Trustees was elected democratically by all participants on
a one vote per person basis, not a one vote per share ba-
sis. 66 The members of the Board of Trustees were required
to be plan participants, but could not be 'officer[s], em-
ployee[s], agent[s] or representative[s] of the union [UFCW
Local 46], or any other labor organization"'67 However, the
Union retained veto power over any possible changes in
power, and any plan modifications or termination of its
agreement that created the plan with Rath.68
Since ESOPs are designed solely for providing owner-
ship,69 additional mechanisms for participation and con-
trol need to be independently instituted. Local 46 fought
for and established a system of worker participation from
the shop floor to the boardroom, in exchange for conces-
sions.70 A top level steering committee was also created,
jointly chaired by union and management officials to meet
monthly, to plan activities, and monitor developments with
a strategic planning group to oversee the future of the com-
pany. On a volunteer basis employees joined Action
Research Teams (ARTs) where discussion and problem
solving was open to all topics related to the management
of Rath.
In 1981 a new CEO was elected. Herbert Einstein
declared an open house policy and promoted communica-
tion between management and workers. Lyle Taylor, the
President of Local 46, also accepted a position on the Board
of Directors in order to more accurately transmit union in-
formation and ideas to the Board.7'
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With a workforce of 2200 employees and an annual
payroll of $35,000,000,12 Rath was able to save $5 million
in labor costs by 1983. This 20 percent reduction in labor
costs per unit of production increased productivity.1
3
However, labor costs were only 15 percent of total costs.
Rath Packing Company was subsequently unable to suc-
cessfully counteract unfavorable externally imposed con-
ditions: high interest rates, high inventory costs, high hog
prices, declines in pork consumption, declines in prices,
non-union competition, and outdated plant and marketing
strategies.
4
Facing these unfavorable conditions, labor-
management relations at Rath began to deteriorate. The
last contract was negotiated in October, 1982. The pen-
sion plan was discontinued, with the approval of the union
by a vote of 60 percent, due to these bad economic cir-
cumstances.7" No other retirement plan replaced it. Rath
had been repeatedly requesting wage deferrals over the
years.7 6 The final request for an additional deferral of $2.50
an hour per person in February, 1983 caused the UFCW
International to file an unfair labor practice charge against
Rath. The International charged that Rath did not have the
authority to negotiate such a deferral under the existing con-
tract. Local 46, however, agreed to the deferral on the ba-
sis that Herb Einstein would resign as CEO and union
president Lyle Taylor would take his place.7 7
In the spring of 1983, when Lyle Taylor became the
company president and CEO,' improved relations were an-
ticipated. However, they worsened. In that year Rath was
forced to file chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. In an ef-
fort to make Rath more attractive to an outside buyer,
management asked and was granted relief from its union
contract by the presiding bankruptcy judge.7 9 In 1984,
management tried to decertify the union. However, they
were barred from doing so because of the above mentioned
pending unfair labor practice charge.80 The worker-owners
then began picketing to get a contract. When a union
steward was fired, 700 workers walked out of Rath for thirty
days and struck against the plant they owned."s The
steward was reinstated and grievance proceedings were
enacted.
These efforts and the reduction of the workforce, from
approximately 2,000 employees right after the buy-out to
approximately 300-400 employees, were unsuccessful. In
early 1985, Rath ceased operation and sold its assets later
that year.8 2
V. THE NECESSARY ROLE UNIONS PLAY
Unions are better positioned than any other institution
in America to ensure the effectiveness of worker owner-
ship. They have the financial resources, the organizational
knowledge, and the ideological commitment to workers' in-
terests and collective action to play a major role in deter-
mining the character of worker ownership in this country.83
As evidenced by the role played by the UFCW Local in
Rath, a union can render numerous services of great sig-
nificance. Employee ownership can revitalize the labor
movement by providing both a means of influencing the
movement of capital and a framework for increased wor-
ker participation and control. Employee ownership can also
serve as a foundation for new organizing drives through
its ability to provide new jobs and financially significant
ownership in start-up companies. The question then be-
comes: how do unions effectively assist in worker owner-
ship and why are they needed once a company becomes
worker owned?
Undoubtedly, unions will be required to develop new
capacities and skills in order to effectively lead the takeover
of industries.8 4 Since unions are not able to own compa-
nies themselves because of legal complications stemming
from conflicts of interest, they will need to develop their
own internal technical resources to provide support for their
locals and members. Union locals and their members will
need advice on how to conduct analyses of a company's
financial worth, market trends, prospective business deci-
sions, and so on. Unions involved in employee ownership
can coordinate the efforts of experts, management, the
community and their members. Organized labor will have
to become proficient in developing effective leadership and
management skills and in facilitating workplace democra-
cy.8
5
A precondition for the effective use of worker owner-
ship is a detailed and full understanding of the company,
its markets and its industry.8 6 It is imperative to establish
that a company is viable prior to any efforts being made
to acquire ownership and control of that company. Em-
ployee ownership and control will not counter deficiencies
in the market.8 7 In the foregoing example, although a feasi-
bility study was conducted at Rath, the union and the em-
ployees made the fatal mistake of ignoring the consultant's
study. Rath's competitive life expectancy, even after the in-
jection of substantial federal grants, was estimated to be
only three to five years, after which time it would again be
unprofitable. Although Rath continued to operate until
1985, worker ownership, perhaps, was not the appropri-
ate option to pursue.88 To avoid the misguided pursuit of
worker ownership, the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Depart-
ment has recommended that, foremost, feasibility studies
on the financial condition of the firm and its industry be
conducted so workers will understand all potential op-
tions."9
Furthermore, due to continuous financial strain, Rath
was forced to reduce pension benefits and eventually dis-
continue the pension plan altogether as a means of increas-
ing capital. Although the ESOP at Rath was never intended
to replace the pension plan, the ESOP, in general, has been
manipulated to achieve many objectives other than its origi-
nal purpose of exclusively benefitting employees.90
Although a minimal number of ESOPs have replaced pen-
sion plans,9 1 the potential risk to employee investments is
severe.92 As a result, the AFL-CIO is beginning to educate
workers as to the distinction between ESOPs and tradi-
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tional pensions plans while advocating the protection of
the latter.
3
ESOPs can redefine the roles of managers, stock-
holders, workers and the union if the ESOP specifically es-
tablishes employee control. Most ESOPs, however, do not
establish a mechanism for shaping company policy on
wages or other equally important decisions which affect
working conditions. In companies which have publicly trad-
ed stock, ESOPs grant employees the same limited voting
rights as other shareholders, such as the right to vote on
the sale of the firm or significant changes in company oper-
ations. In companies without publicly traded stock, the law
does not require most voting rights to be passed through
to employees. In general, voting must be passed through
only on major corporate issues (e.g., mergers, dissolution,
sale of all assets).94 Studies show that in 85 percent of all
companies with ESOPs, worker-owners do not have full
voting rights. 95 Often employees are not even granted the
right to vote for the Board of Directors. One ESOP
promoter told owners: "Through the ESOP, you can sell
the company and still keep it"96 Essentially, it all depends
on managements willingness to actively involve its new
worker-owners in decisionmaking.97 A handful of compa-
nies have organized ESOPs such that employees elect direc-
tors, or have a voice regarding issues such as wages, hours,
or working conditions.
It is essential that employee interests are ensured and
protected during negotiations establishing an ESOP; or-
ganized labor can fill this role. The time to establish con-
trol mechanisms such as immediate allocation of voting
stock, information exchange channels, and the right to elect
board members is before the ESOP instrument is finalized
and implemented. 00 To that end, worker representatives
should be sensitive to locating worker-sympathetic finan-
cial sources and legal advisors.
Although the law allows an ESOP to prevent employee
voting on issues that require shareholder voting, the law
will also allow the ESOP to stipulate to a wider array of
issues that employees can vote on. Substantial employee
voting rights can be provided for within the constraints of
ESOP law.98 A democratic ESOP9 9 can be instituted:
UFCW was instrumental in establishing a democratic
ESOP at Rath.
One must keep in mind, however, that democratic
ESOPs still only accord employees the right to vote on
shareholder issues, which are granted and often quite limit-
ed by state corporate statutory law. Once a union has en-
sured the establishment of a democratic ESOP, they should
also take the initiative in choosing new company manage-
ment and educating management and workers about the
concepts of democratic ownership. '1 Education of the
workforce has become paramount in the agenda of many
of the existing private organizations providing technical as-
sistance to worker-owned companies.0 2
As noted earlier, control is as important as ownership;
this applies to ESOPs, worker cooperatives and situations
where the collective bargaining agreement provides em-
ployee ownership rights. It is this author's position that a
worker-managed firm should place ultimate discretion over
all matters lying within its field of choice in the hands of
the firm's personnel, with each member of the workforce
having an equal vote regardless of what skills or manageri-
al rank he or she may have.'0 3 Where plans are primarily
designed to improve productivity without offering effective
control, the union is an essential advocate for the workers
in a continuing struggle for control.'0 4 Even the more
democratic ESOPs and worker cooperatives require the per-
spective of the union.'05 As in Rath, the union can be ef-
fective in instituting a system of worker participation from
the shop floor to the board in order to obtain and main-
tain control' 0 6
Moreover, the union can monitor the daily operation
of the company. Unions can help ensure that the firm is
managed in the best interests of the workers. They can act
as a "forum through which to balance the interests of wor-
kers" and the "interests of the company" which' are not al-
ways coterminous, even where the employees have
workplace control' 0 7 Unions can represent workers' in-
terests in decisions regarding the purchase of new equip-
ment, retirement benefits, and plant expansions. As a leader
of the USWA said: "A union in an employee owned firm
must consider not just wages but also reinvestment:'0 8 Un-
ions have already made advances towards filling this role.
For instance, unions have been granted the right to inter-
nal company reports and sales information,'0 9 which can
be used to keep employees informed about the company's
financial condition.
Most importantly, the union is needed to act as a
"legitimate opposition" between the individual and the
majority position. This "legitimate opposition concept
is rooted in the political community's first amendment
protection of dissenters' rights to free speech." 0 The un-
ion maintains its traditional role of protecting minority in-
terests within the workplace community. The pro-employee
representation is needed to act as a forum for member
grievances. Surveys in unionized companies with ESOPs
indicate that most workers believe they need unions even
when they are "the owners"."' Stewards still have grievances
to handle. The UFCW played and maintained an active role
in representing unsatisfied worker-owners and protecting
their individual rights at Rath." 2 The union supported the
strike and represented the fired union steward during
grievance procedures. Even in the well-known Mondragon
network of cooperatives in Spain, where only one strike
has occurred in over twenty years, the importance of the
union in protecting individual rights is often overlooked.
Although the strike led to changes in operations and was
considered a beneficial learning experience, each of the
strike leaders was summarily fired and not reinstated."3 Fur-
thermore, collective bargaining agreements or formalized
forums of some form are still needed to ensure fair arrange-
ments for promotions, layoffs, discipline and safe and
SPRNG 1990 IC
healthy working conditions." 4 In the Denver Cab Compa-
ny, a worker cooperative, the organizational structure in-
tentionally includes a negotiating committee composed of
several board members and coop managers to represent
members in bargaining with its six unions.! 5 Without for-
mal and legitimate representation for employees interests,
these interests are not considered in the daily operations
of the business."
6
The union is necessary in the development of a wor-
ker owned company and essential during its operations.1 7
The democratic organization requires an institutionalized
opposition that is recognized as legitimate. It is imperative
that the union be accepted as legitimate from the incep-
tion of the worker-owned company, as one of the first
abuses of power is to raise the costs of opposition." 8 In
order for the union to assume this position, an outline of
the union's oppositional role, the structure of the grievance
procedure, and the funding of the union's local operations
should be incorporated in the constitution of the new
democratic firm.' 9
VI. LEGAL ISSUES
As unions become more involved in worker ownership
they are stepping beyond traditional labor-management re-
lations and labor law. This paper will discuss two main is-
sues, union representation on corporate boards of directors
and the persuasive impact of pension funds, that give rise
to several legal questions of which unions should be aware
A. UNION REPRESENTATION ON
CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
Union representation on corporate boards is consonant
with the policies underlying American labor law as it has
been interpreted and developed over the past forty years.
Union board representation of employees is not a substi-
tute for the collective bargaining process. 20 Rather, it com-
plements and extends an institutional process that has
changed significantly since its origin. 2 ' Although employ-
ers and the courts still strongly resist union intervention in
managerial prerogatives,'22 the scope of bargaining has
nonetheless expanded to encompass matters formally con-
sidered managerial prerogatives and, as evidenced by the
growing use of joint labor-management committees, cooper-
ation has increasingly replaced confrontation.
Union board representation is a logical expansion of
employee influence on the 'running of the business' Board
representation would provide the union with direct input
into decisions presently beyond the scope of collective bar-
gaining. Moreover, because the issues addressed on the
directorate level are often not discussed during the bargain-
ing process, the position on the board could be the only
way for the workers' viewpoint to ever be considered in a
timely manner. Thus utilized, union representation would
effectively complement the collective bargaining process.
Union representation could reduce the inefficiency
resulting from organizational complexity, board-of-director
ineffectiveness, and capital market distortions. Union-
provided information could supplement information provid-
ed by management. The union-provided information could
illustrate the flaws in managements reasoning, thus assist-
ing the shareholders and directors in making informed de-
cisions. Union directors could also help to check
management inefficiency; they could devote considerably
more time to board matters than independent outside direc-
tors, and they would not have the same sympathy for
management as members of the "closed club of elites."' 23
Finally, because of their independence, union directors could
threaten to communicate managerial failings to manage-
ment's two constituencies-the workers and the share-
holders. Once again, the need for legitimate opposition is
demonstrated.
Agreement between the union and the corporation to
incorporate union-based board representation would pro-
vide a valid and economically beneficial exchange between
the parties.!2 4 Unless the parties explicitly indicate to the
contrary, the union presumably receives from the exchange
a board position to represent worker interests.' 2- The par-
ties engage in arm's length bargaining, seeking out the best
possible bargain they can attain given the legal constraints
on their behavior. Therefore, when a corporation accedes
to a union's demand for a position on the board of direc-
tors, it evidently is the best bargain the corporation's
representatives could reach.
26
However, there are a series of legal impediments to un-
ion representation on corporate boards under current cor-
porate and labor law. Questions have arisen concerning the
fiduciary duties of those who serve as both directors and
union representatives, employer domination and union in-
terference and the union representative's duty of fair
representation under the National Labor Relations Act, and
the duty of information disclosure and antitrust and com-
petition problems. Corporate and labor law is, however,
changing to enable unions to represent employee interests
on boards. The legal impediments outlined below should
be eroded and the alternatives that have been suggested
to facilitate representation without legal ramifications should
be strengthened to allow employee ownership to expand
and employees' interests to be considered in the daily oper-
ation of businesses.
a. The Fiduciary Responsibilities of
Corporate Directors and Union Officials
Union representatives on corporate boards face a con-
flict of interest problem under current corporate and labor
law."'27 A corporate director has a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration's shareholders; a union official has a fiduciary duty
to the union and its members. A union official on a cor-
porate board thus has a duty to both union members and
to shareholders. Whenever these two groups' interests con-
flict, the union officer is faced with a possible breach of
one of these duties.
The directors of a corporation are fiduciaries to the cor-
poration's shareholders. The directors have a duty to serve
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the corporation's best interests and not to profit personal-
ly at the expense of the corporation! 28 Traditionally, a board
of directors could act only to make profits for stock-
holders. 29 Thus, a union board representative would not
be able to vote to further employee interests when they con-
flicted with shareholder interest without breaching the direc-
tor's fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Yet, courts have gone beyond the traditional approach
to directors' fiduciary duties. 30 The original contention for
vesting corporate control in the shareholders was that
shareholders, by providing the capital for the enterprise,
bore the risk of failure. This contention falters when one
considers that workers not only bear a substantial portion
of the risk of failure. but are also less able to protect them-
selves from assuming this risk.
A radical shift from current law is not necessary;
boards of directors are already making decisions benefit-
ting employees. For example, directors have been allowed
to exercise uin good faith, the infinite details of business,
including wages which shall be paid to employees, the num-
ber of hours they shall work, the conditions under which
labor shall be carried on, and the prices for which products
shall be offered to the public.' 3 ' The courts are beginning
to grant boards wider discretion in considering the needs
of employees when developing corporate policy and are up-
holding the early stated principle that corporations have
an implied power to perform acts wholly or in part to pro-
tect or aid employees. 32 Corporations act as members of
society with certain social obligations and have a respon-
sibility to address the needs of employees, consumers, and
the community in which they operate.1 3
3
Furthermore the courts can rely on the express vote
of the shareholders or their representatives, the board, to
indicate that effective union representation is in the share-
holders' long-term interests. Approving the offer of the
board seat is a further indication of compliance with share-
holder interests.3 The legal structure has already provid-
ed for worker input into corporate affairs: collective
bargaining focuses on wages, hours and conditions of em-
ployment.
However, voting to further shareholder interests when
they conflict with worker interests could also violate another
duty to which union officers are held by law. Section 501
of the Landrum-Griffin Act imposes a fiduciary responsi-
bility on union officials "to refrain from dealing with [the
union] as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party
in any matter connected with his duties . . . " As the
Act fails to define the precise scope of an official's fiduciary
obligations, the courts have turned to common law prece-
dent and the specific language of section 501. Basically,
the special problems and functions of a labor organization
have been taken into account in evaluating the actions of
union officials. To date, courts have rarely intervened to
condemn a union official's conduct. 36
There are strong arguments that, in most circum-
stances, a union official on a corporate board would not
violate section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.1 37 Provid-
ed the employee representative does not act to undermine
union democracy or engage in personal profiteering, an em-
ployee representative may take actions without fear of
violating any fiduciary obligations to members of the un-
ion. As long as union democracy is maintained, employees
have an effective vehicle for replacing the representatives
and protecting their interests.
It could therefore be argued that the union board
representative's principal fiduciary responsibility should be
to the employees in the bargaining unit represented by the
union.13 1 When employee interests are implicated, the un-
ion director's sole fiduciary duty should be to further those
interests; however, when specific employee interests are not
directly involved, the union director should have the usual
corporate directors fiduciary duty to advance the corpora-
tionds interests, as defined by law.
An employee's welfare is closely, even if indirectly, linked
to the corporation's financial health. Employees should be
able to bring derivative suits on either of two causes of ac-
tion: that the union director failed to attempt to advance
employee interests or, if specific employee interests were
not involved, that the director breached his fiduciary duty
to further the corporation's welfare. To protect themselves,
the shareholders should also have a right of action against
union representatives on the board when an act in ques-
tion is not part of a good faith effort to advance employee
interests.
Corporations certainly have an impact beyond share-
holders alone yet shareholders are the sole group (other
than management) with any evident representation on the
board of directors. In seeking reform, requests by interest-
ed parties for outside directors and elections of public in-
terest directors have been made and granted. Inadvertently,
however, the workers, who have one of the strongest and
clearest claims to representation, have been overlooked.
Employees' interests should be represented to boards of
directors as a serious consideration in the functioning of
the company.
b. Employer Domination/Union Interference
Perhaps the most obvious potential legal barrier to un-
ion involvement in board representation lies in the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act. 40 Cooperation between
management and the union could be considered interfer-
ence or domination of the collective bargaining arrangement
and either party could be accused of an unfair labor prac-
tice. 41 Under the Act, employee suggestions committees,
faculty governance boards, and junior boards of directors
have been termed labor organizations' and violations have
been found.142 Activities as superficially innocuous as
providing office space or supplies have constituted unfair
labor practices.'43 The creation of a codetermined board
of directors in a worker owned company is at the least a
potential violation of the Act.
However, there is a growing consensus that union direc-
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tors will not likely be found in violation of section 8(a)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Acts.144 It is also doubtful
that these conflicts will arise in employee owned firms where
directors elected by the members sit on the company's
board!45 As long as a majority of the board is not appointed
by the union, the NLRB is unlikely to find a proximate
danger of infection of the bargaining process unless there
is hard evidence of some actual abuse; mere potential for
abuse is not sufficient.146 Board discussion of collective bar-
gaining strategy is one area in which board representation
of worker interests is questionable. Participation in this area
conflicts with the adversarial model of collective bargain-
ing and would provide the union with an unfair advantage
in that process. One avoidance strategy might be for un-
ion directors to excuse themselves from such discussions 47
c. Duty of Fair Representation
Union representatives have a duty to treat their mem-
bers in a "manner that is not arbitrary, capricious, dis-
criminatory or in bad faith:"48 Unions may unexpectedly
violate their duty of fair representation while making deci-
sions associated with the establishment and implementa-
tion of worker ownership. Two cases illustrate this potential
problem. 49 In Bodecker v. Local Union, No. P-46, ' 50 the
plaintiff claimed that the union coerced employees into ac-
cepting an ESOP by telling them it was necessary for the
company's continued survival. The court held that, even if
the union's statements were not true, they were not made
arbitrarily or in bad faith. In Baker v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.,51 the plaintiff argued that the union had failed to pur-
sue pension claims against the company following the em-
ployer's buy-out by an ESOR The Court found no bad faith
or egregious conduct, and ruled that the union had attempt-
ed to act in the best interest of the entire unit.
The union's official duty of fair representation, which
prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of employees
or groups of employees, is unlikely to be violated if the un-
ion takes precautions to ensure that all changes in negotiat-
ed benefits are collectively bargained for by the union and
ratified by union members 52 Following the procedures
specified in the union constitution and bylaws and explicitly
established contracts, the goal should be to ensure that the
interests of all members within the locals and locals within
the international are taken into account and treated impar-
tially in making decisions and providing assistance in em-
ployee ownership situations. 53
d. Access to and Disclosure of Information
Corporate directors commonly enjoy a broad right of
inspection of corporate books and records. A union
representative should have the same right of access to in-
formation. Expansive disclosure is necessary; knowledge
of the financial condition of the corporation is crucial to
achieve organizational and worker goals. Yet the duty to
provide information under the NLRA to members or their
representatives has been limited 54
Another potential problem, which presents a slightly
more complex situation, involves the confidentiality of in-
formation. If union representatives are allowed to release
information obtained through their position on the board
when such a release represents a good-faith effort to ad-
vance specific employee interests, this would conflict with
the director's duty not to disclose information. Yet, dis-
closure is necessary in order to make the union director's
representation of employees' interests effective. Prohibiting
disclosure of information would require the union represen-
tative to mislead other union officials intentionally whenever
confidential information led them to support union posi-
tions or actions different from those that appeared best to
other union officials and would inevitably conflict with the
obligation to explain to employee constituents the reasons
underlying various actions. Withholding such information
would seem to contravene, explicitly, the command of sec-
tion 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.- 5
Because of the need for exchange of information in
order to meaningfully include employees' interests in the
operation of business, union representatives should have
the same right of access to information as is common
among other directors. Although the duty to provide infor-
mation under the NLRA has been limited,'5 6 a strong ar-
gument can be made for the necessity of the exchange of
information in order to effectuate the union director's
representation of employees interests and to prevent a vio-
lation of section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin Act. As fur-
ther support for this position, it is well recognized that
employee shareholders are privy to information that share-
holders at-large may not necessarily be entitled to receive.57
e. Antitrust and Competition Problems
Union representatives on the boards of competing
firms might possibly have reasons for and opportunities to
engage in pricefixing, in violation of the Sherman 58 and
Clayton' 9 Antitrust Acts. Essentially, no person can be a
director in any two or more corporations at the same time
under certain conditions. 60 However, the Clayton Act does
not prohibit many kinds of "indirect interlocks" between cor-
porations as long as one individual is not a director of two
competing corporations.' 6 While it is possible that labor
unions are exempt from the prohibition against interlock-
ing directorates, the issue has not been brought to court 62
A union that appointed members to the boards of com-
peting companies as a result of the collective bargaining
process would be in a considerably weaker position than
one in which union members at individual companies are
elected by the worker-stockholders. 63 A union representa-
tive elected by local members would be much more likely
to have board status as an individual serving as an interest-
ed stockholder representing other interested stockholders
than would a union board member appointed by an inter-
national. In that case, the representative of the international
might be regarded chiefly as a legal "person7 with a poten-
tial interest in collusion.6 4 Union members who serve on
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corporate boards of competing firms should not be individu-
als who have an opportunity and reason to meet on a regu-
lar basis within the union.6 5
On the other hand, the NLRB does present problems
when the analysis is of competition. In Bausch & Lomb,
the NLRB held that an employer does not violate the Act 166
by refusing to bargain with the certified union when the un-
ion has established a business enterprise in the same lo-
cality and industry as that of the employer and has thus
become one of its direct competitors.1 67 Naturally, the abil-
ity of an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith in this
situation poses a problem when an international union is
involved in converting several companies within an indus-
try into worker owned companies. However, the principles
of Bausch & Lomb do not apply to situations in which the
employees own stock in their employer 69 since individual
union members who own stock in their own employer are
not in direct competition. Thus, unions that own a com-
peting business are in a more vulnerable position. However,
Bausch & Lomb has not been strictly followed 1'
In sum, the interests of workers should be seriously
considered in the development of corporate policy, even in
the worker owned company. To that end, union spokesper-
sons, representing the interests of not only their members
but of the entire workforce, should not be precluded from
boards of directors.
B. THE PERSUASIVE IMPACT OF PENSION
FUNDS
Aside from the legal issues that surround the poten-
tial conflicts of interest when union officials sit on corporate
boards of corporations, the legal issues that encompass
the use of pension funds to assist employee ownership must
also be explored. The innovative use of pension funds can
be an important tool in facilitating and implementing em-
ployee ownership. Pension funds have acquired an impor-
tant place in the national economy. In 1970 alone, pension
fund purchases of common stock exceeded $4.6 billion.!7
Presently, 870,000 private pension plans hold assets of $2
trillion, or about $8,000 for every man, woman and child
in the United States.7 " Pension funds are an extremely im-
portant benefit to individual employees and their unions. 7 4
Unfortunately, the pension assets of organized labor
are often invested in enterprises that are philosophically an-
tithetical to the goals of unions' 7 However, unions have
made only slight advancements in the realm of pension fund
management. In the late 1960's, the AFL-CIO, UAW, and
Ralph Nader, representing the Public Interest Research
Group, called for flexibility in the law to enable trustees to
invest in high social priority projects 7 6 The Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union's (ACTWU) corporate
campaign against J.P. Stevens and Company, embarked
upon after seventeen years of battle when the traditional
tactics of gaining recognition failed, successfully utilized
their influence over pension funds. The union was able to
achieve victory by manipulating pension fund assets owned
by other unions to force J.P. Stevens to come to the bar-
gaining table.77
In 1980, the AFL-CIO released its first study of union
strategies for pension investment control. The AFLCIO
recommended using such strategies as capital investment
to influence recognition by subjecting the fundholders to
boycott campaigns. It also endorsed the use of share vot-
ing rights held by pension funds to pass union supported
resolutions at corporate shareholder meetings. Further, it
recommended that attempts be made to utilize pension as-
sets to finance home mortgages or other loans for fund
members and for the creation of jobs. Control by the un-
ion over the trustees was deemed imperative. 79
Some unions have been able to secure the right to in-
fluence pension investing within the collective bargaining
agreement. 8" So far, however, unions have not played a
significant role in pension fund management. Their reluc-
tance is primarily two-fold' 8 First, unions fear the legal and
economic implications of imprudent investments. A group
of beneficiaries can bring a class action derivative suit
against the union for breach of fiduciary duty. The result
could be a liability of millions of dollars to the union sim-
ply for making a pro-labor investment. The extent to which
unions can use pension funds to influence or control in-
vestment is further restricted by the legal framework estab-
lished by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA),'82 the federal act governing private pension
funds. The legal framework is both comprehensive, in its
coverage of the activities of pension plan fiduciaries, and
complex, in its restrictions on the management or disposi-
tion of plan assets. ERISA is further complicated by the
lack of clear judicial and legislative interpretations of the
statute. Second, the unions have generally avoided involve-
ment in the management of the economy.
Although both reasons for the unions' reluctance to
become involved in pension fund management are valid,
the first reason is more complex and flexible, and there-
fore more prone to interesting future opportunities. The de-
velopment of law surrounding ERISA will either be a
promising path for the future of the labor movement or a
lost dream to the American population. This section will
deal solely with ERISA and the case law and political state-
ments made concerning it.
The potential power unions could acquire can easily
be equated with the power now possessed by banks.8 "
When a bank purchases stock with the assets of a pen-
sion fund, it has the sole voting rights for that stock. Thus,
the bank has substantial influence and, in some cases, con-
trol of the company's policy. The bank is consulted on each
major decision of the company, thus allowing it to main-
tain a position of counselor in the economy. The bank can
use pension assets to extend credit or deny credit to com-
panies throughout the country. A bank decides which com-
panies, which philosophies, and which social goals will be
funded and able to thrive. As another condition of invest-
ment, a bank can insist that its chairman sit on the board
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rof directors of the company to ensure the bank has a greater
say in company policy.
It is important to understand how far a union can go
in making socially beneficial investments, one of the major
goals of which is to create jobs and stimulate the econo-
my in the community where the pension funds originate.
Pension funds could possibly be used as collateral for loans
needed to establish worker owned companies, purchase ex-
isting companies, and consequently, create jobs for union
members.184
Judicial interpretations of ERISA, and the approval of
investments under ERISA, have focused on three parts of
the Act. First, there is a duty of loyalty that trustees must
abide by: investments must be made solely in the interest
of beneficiaries and exclusively for the purpose of their
benefit' 85 Second, investments must be made according
to the prudent investment rule.' 86 Finally, certain transac-
tions are prohibited' 8 7
However, decisions are not always made methodical-
ly in accordance with these three categories. Some uncer-
tainty as to how to proceed with investments stems from
the confusion in judicial decisions. In Brock v.Walton,'88 Lo-
cal 675 of the Operating Engineers International Union used
its pension fund to purchase and develop ninety-five acres
of land in conjunction with a Florida Real Estate Project.
The fund also planned to finance the construction of several
buildings on the site. Union members were to be used as
the primary source of labor in land development and con-
struction of the buildings. The fund also issued first mort-
gage loans on residential property. The District Court, in
ruling on the question of the creation of jobs, held that ERI-
SA U404(a)(1)(A), "for the exclusive benefit" provision, does
not simply prohibit a party other than a plans participants
and beneficiaries from benefitting in some measure from
a prudent transaction.'89 The Court of Appeals, on the other
hand, focused on the prudent investment rule, and allowed
the fund to issue first mortgage loans on residential property
although the loans were to carry interest at a rate lower
than the prevailing rates in the community. The court
based its decision on the critical fact that the trustees had
consulted with lawyers, accountants, actuaries and invest-
ment bankers over a six month period and therefore, did
not violate the prudent investors rule.'90 In commenting on
prohibited transactions, the court distinguished this case
from other cases involving self-dealing or preferential loans
to plan officers where the trustees ran afoul of the rule pro-
hibiting transactions with "parties in interests." 9'
Certain factions of organized labor have mistakenly
hailed the decision as setting a firm and favorable prece-
dent for union pension investment' 92 However, since the
court did not decide the case under the duty of loyalty pro-
vision,' 93 the precedent set is neither as firm nor as favora-
ble as believed,' 94 and leaves the most important question,
of what "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries, for the exclusive benefit of providing benefits
to the participants and their beneficiaries"'95 means, un-
answered.
Under the exclusive benefit portion of this provision,
questioning has centered primarily on the meaning of finan-
cial benefits to employees. The financial community has
argued, and the Department of Labor has agreed, that this
phrase refers only to the economic gain to be achieved from
a certain investment. 96 The term is generally used through-
out the Act in reference to those cash benefits that a par-
ticipant or his family would receive in accordance with the
specifications of the plan. 97 Advocates of socially respon-
sible investing contend that the declaration of policy
advanced'98 does not refer to the objective of providing non-
financial benefits to the employees through a socially
responsible investment policy. Instead, the declaration and
accompanying findings focus upon the need for fiduciary
standards which ensure the financial "soundness" and "sta-
bility" of the plan. 99 Thus, the union can argue that non-
financial benefits are within the exclusive benefit rule; if the
participants are not working because jobs have shifted else-
where, contributions to the fund will cease. If contributions
cease, the fund will not be able to meet its fundamental
responsibilities.
In fact, the preamble to the Labor Department regula-
tions points out that investment in securities issued by a
small or new company, which may be riskier than those
of a "blue chip" company, may be entirely proper under the
Act.20 ' Furthermore, Congress has been considering the
limitations of the exclusive benefit rule and is realizing the
need to broaden the rule to allow consideration of broader




However, union officials may have difficulty proving,
for example, that a policy investing only in unionized com-
panies is intended to benefit the participants as workers
rather than the union itself.2 2 Unions need to be leery of
the collateral benefit to the union violating the "solely in the
interest" portion of the duty of loyalty.
In Blankenship v. Boyle,20 3 the District Court held that
manipulation of the United Mine Workers' pension fund to
coerce utility companies into purchasing coal supplies from
UMW was a breach of fiduciary duty. While acknowledg-
ing that workers do benefit from investment practices that
strengthen the union,2 4 the court found a clear case of self-
dealing, in effect deciding under the prohibited transactions
section of ERISA; the fact that the union had the funds
in a no interest account was considered significant.
In Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System of New
York,2"' defendant trustees invested in highly speculative
city bonds in hopes of averting the bankruptcy of New York
City. Plaintiffs brought a suit alleging breach of fiduciary
duties. The court held that the city's possible bankruptcy
was sufficient cause for the investment decision. This col-
lateral benefit sufficiently satisfied the primary interests of
the participants. It must be noted that a possible flaw in
the argument utilizing this case to support socially respon-
sible investing is that the pension fund was a public retire-
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ment plan and therefore not covered by ERISA.
As a result of these decisions, a case by case analysis
has developed. In order for unions to proceed in gaining
control of pension funds, they must adhere to a few guide-
lines.20 6 First, fiduciaries should analyze the needs and ob-
jectives of the participants and the plan and must determine
whether the financial characteristics of the investment will
satisfy the prudent investment requirements of the statute.
Financial advisors with an interest in long term investment
should be hired. A critical factor in defending an investment
is the development of a rationale for the investment deci-
sion at the time it is made. While a fiduciary may be able
to follow a socially sensitive investment policy by choos-
ing to invest in worker owned companies and argue the
nonfinancial benefits to employees, a socially dictated in-
vestment policy, in which financial comparability is
sacrificed in order to achieve some social purpose will prob-
ably not withstand scrutiny under the prudent investor
rule. 20
7
Second, assessments of investments have included a
review of the fiduciary's conduct at the time the decision
was made. Approval of investments has been granted when
the plan's investors have been able to produce a complete
analysis showing how the investments successfully further
the plan's investment objectives. Empirical support is man-
datory. If there is any element of self-interest in the choice
of investments, whether that interest is financial or ideo-
logical, the statute may prohibit such conduct. It is essen-
tial that investment programs be designed primarily to
further the interests of participants and beneficiaries. In
designing a plan that permits only investments which aid
the interests of the plan participants as participants and
that simultaneously attempts to support worker ownership,
the final result might be investment in that particular com-
pany, thus raising the common criticism of placing the in-
vestment at the mercy of a single enterprise. The collateral
benefit doctrine is a seemingly uncompromising one
However, efforts should be made to circumvent it by argu-
ing that employees do benefit by the creation of jobs, the
reinvestment of funds within the communities, and the
strengthening of their union. Thus, they remain the primary
interest benefitting from the investment.
The possible benefits of controlling pension fund in-
vestment far outweigh the possible legal challenges. Un-
ions should pursue the management of pension funds to
promote the needs of their members. Worker ownership
can be legitimately advanced as a socially responsible in-
vestment and such investment is legal within the frame-
work of ERISA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current problems in the economy warrant the labor
movement's reassessment of strategies it uses to encoun-
ter new challenges. Although in the past unionists have
wrestled with a variety of strategies, none have so far been
more than moderately successful. Employee ownership is
a viable strategy unions can pursue as a way to gain con-
trol over capital and anchor capital within communities.
Realizing the power worker ownership has to support lo-
cal communities by creating, retaining and improving jobs,
organized labor should include worker ownership as a tac-
tic in the general struggle for economic reform.
In order for worker owned companies to survive as
profitable businesses and worker ownership to be an ef-
fective tool in revitalizing the economy, unions will have to
develop new skills to intimately assist workers in the de-
velopment of worker owned businesses. Through develop-
ment of worker ownership, unions are in a pivotal position
to assist in economic development.
These attempts at worker ownership, although quite
successful at times, need to be developed, improved and
strengthened. The labor movement should take advantage
of the growing private and public support for worker owner-
ship and try to influence and develop this so it can meet
organized labor's needs. Union policies regarding employee
ownership need to reflect a commitment to worker owner-
ship and guide future projects. Clearly, unions can assist
workers in becoming owners and, at the same time, create
new and vital roles for themselves. The necessity for sub-
stantial union involvement during negotiations and for a
continued strong union presence once employee ownership
is established is imperative to ensure workers' rights and
benefits during and after negotiations. Most importantly,
unions can expedite the democratization of corporate
institutions.
Finally, the numerous legal questions raised by the in-
volvement of unions in employee ownership should not dis-
courage employee ownership and control in a situation
which makes financial sense for both business and em-
ployees. The AFLCIO should mount a nationwide cam-
paign for worker control of pension funds through less
stringent requirements on union investment. With proper
legal precautions, these obstacles should not prevent labor
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8. Swinney, Worker Ownership: A Tactic for Labor, 6 Lab. Res.
Rev. 99, 103 (Spring 1985). But see Slott, The Case Against Worker
Ownership, 6 Lab. Res. Rev. 83 (Spring 1985) (arguing that worker
ownership will have an overall negative impact on the labor movement
by undermining union standards and striking at the heart of union
solidarity).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 17-31.
10. See infra notes 1214.
11. 1 have chosen not to duplicate work which is available elsewhere
in describing these basic methods of acquiring ownership and control. See
infra notes 12-14 (noting articles adequately describing the technicalities
of these three methods).
12. An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is defined in I.R.C.
§ 4975(e)(7) (1976 & Supp.IV 1980). It is an IRS-qualified stock bonus
or stock purchase plan, pursuant to I.R.C. § 401(a) (1976 & Supp.IV 1980),
designed to encourage employers to give or sell stock to their employees
through a trust (called an Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT)). For
a further explanation of ESOPs see Pitegoff, The Democratic ESOP, (un-
published manuscript available from the Industrial Cooperative Associa-
tion (ICA) 58 Day Street, Suite 203, Somerville, MA
02144-2896)(1987)[hereinafter Democratic ESOP; Ronan, Tax Incentives
Encouraging Use of ESOPs as Corporate Finance and Anti-Takeover
Devices, 58 Temp.L.Q. 115 (1985). The following are examples of ESOPs
unions have been involved in:
E The United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) Lo-
cal 46 saved Rath Packing Company in Waterloo, Iowa from bankruptcy
by taking wage cuts in exchange for 60 percent of stock. Although consi-
dered a turning point in worker ownership, the ufiion for the first time in-
itiating the transaction and establishing a democratic ESOP, Rath Packing
existed in a no-win market. C. Gunn, Workers' Self-Management
in the U.S. (1980); Redmon, Mueller & Daniels, A Lost Dream: Worker
Control at Rath Packing, 6 Lab.Res.Rev. 5 (Spring 1985) [hereinafter
Redmon]; Rosen supra note 2, at 10; see infra notes 40-82 and accom-
panying text.
0 The Almagamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACT-
WU) was able to transform the closed Levi Strauss Company into Colt
Enterprises, a 100 percent employee owned company In Tyler, Texas In
1987. Gullet & Young, A Colt is Born: The Reopening of a Clothing Plant,
VIII Employee Ownership Report 5 (Jan/Feb 1988).
0 The United Automobile Workers (UAW) for Region 9A played
a key role in establishing one of the largest employee-owned democratic
industrial companies in the country, Seymour Specialty Wire In the Nau.
gatuck Valley, Connecticut. Galdston, Naugatuck Valley Project, Work-
ing Paper #1, Worker Ownership, Midwest Center for Labor Research,
1985.
N The UAW Local 736 was also responsible for converting Hyatt
Roller Bearing Plant in Clark, New Jersey to a worker-owned enterprise,
Hyatt-Clark, when General Motors announced it was closing the plant.
The ESOP was not fully democratic and the attempt by the union to negoti-
ate such was the cause of continuing labor conflict at Hyatt-Clark. General
Motors cancellation of its contract with Hyatt-Clark in 1987 caused the
plant to close later that year. The Hyatt-Clark ESOP: An Interview with
Jim May, 6 Lab.Res.Rev. 27 (Spring 1985); Rosen, supra note 2, at
12; A Noble Experiment Goes Bankrupt, NY Times, May 3,1987, sec. 3.
The United Steelworkers of America (USWA) is the only Industrial
union with an active program of support for employee ownership Initia-
tives. As a result, USWA has been involved in several employee owner-
ship projects:
I Republic Storage Company:. In 1986, the 600 employees of Repub-
lic Storage Company in Canton, Ohio purchased their company from Its
former owner, LTV Corporation through an ESOP. A new seven member
board of directors consists of two representatives from USWA, two from
management and three outsiders. The company is the nations largest
manufacturer of lockers.
E Republic Container Company: The sixty employees of the plant
in Nitro, West Virginia purchased their steel barrel manufacturing plant
from LTV, establishing a democratic ESOP. The employees elect a six
member board which is required to include one union member, one manage-
ment representative and a representative of the lenders. The plant has
been profitable for all twenty-eight years of its operation.
E Northern Copper Company: After being closed for three years
and with significant help from the state of Michigan, the mine reopened
as a 70 percent ESOP-owned company. Rosen, supra note 2, at 21-22,
35; Ball, United Steelworkers ... Initiatives, The Entrepreneurial Econo-
my, Nov. 1987, at 11-14. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
* Independent Steel Union fostered the purchase of Weirton Steel
from National Steel through the establishment of a nondemocratic ESOP
and the creation of shop floor participation. Since the buy-out, Weirton
has done very well. In fact, it has been the most profitable integrated steel.
maker in the U.S., clearly showing that an employee owned company can
prosper in this industry. Lynd, Why We Opposed the Buy-out at Weirton
Steel, 6 Lab.Res.Rev. 41 (Spring 1985); Anderson, An Employee Stock
Ownership Plan: The History of the Weirton Steel Buy-Out, 26
Duq.L.Rev. 657 (Spring 1988); Rosen, supra note 2, at 20.
13. A cooperative is a company that is wholly owned by the people
who work in it. For a further explanation worker cooperatives see Eller-
man & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation, XI N.Y.U. Rev.L. & Soc.
Change 441 (1982-3). The following are examples of Worker Coopera-
tives unions have been involved in:
0 UFCW was able to persuade A&P to grant the workers a right
to first refusal on the Philadelphia division stores and endorse a capital
loan fund for these buy-outs. As a result, five Owned & Operated (O&O)
Supermarkets have been opened. Kreiner, Worker Ownership as the Ba-
sis for an Integrated, Proactive Development Model, XV N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 227 (1986-87); Eggerton, Workers Take Over the Store,
The NY Times Magazine, Sept. 11, 1983.
N Bricklayers and Allied Crafts Union Local #1 of Birmingham,
Alabama with the financial and technical assistance of their Internation-
al Union brought forth a new cooperative corporation, Jefferson Mason-
ry, Inc. The union has decided to discontinue the Birmingham project at
least for the time being. Mackin, Jefferson Masonry, Inc., The Entrepreneu-
rial Economy, Nov. 1987 at, 13-14; letter received from C. Mackin, Nov.
12, 1989.
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N Independent Drivers Association initiated the worker takeover of
an ongoing and profitable firm. In 1979, Denver Yellow Cab Cooperative
Association was opened as a worker cooperative and is currently the fourth
largest taxi company. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 152-161; 166-176.
14. For a discussion of creative collective bargaining see Compa, Bai-
cich, Barber, & Banks, The JAM District 100 Model - A Debate, 5
Lab.Res.Rev. 81 (Summer 1984) [hereinafter LAMDebate] (discussing
the International Association of Machinists District 100's collective bar-
gaining agreement with Eastern Airlines, saving Eastern from bankrupt-
cy in 1984).
E The International Association of Machinists District 100 was able
to rescue Eastern Airlines from bankruptcy. In exchange for 18 percent
wage cuts, employees received 12.5 million common shares - about 25
percent of outstanding stock - and 3 million dividend paying preferred
shares set at the value of the concessions. District 100 won the right to
vet, on a one-time basis only, both Easterrs 1984 business plan and
the financial restructuring program made possible by the union's wage con-
cessions. On a continuing basis, the union also won the following manage-
ment rights:
E the right to review the company's business plans, major capital
expenditures and expansions and 'to participate in the company's decision-
making process" in these areas;
0 the right to appeal any company plan or decision directly to the
board of directors;
" unlimited access to all company financial information;
" a right to participate in the design of new facilities and in the re-
design of existing facilities;
" four seats on the board of directors; and,
" a requirement that the company disclose a full list of all the con-
sultants it hires. Id. at 84; see Rosen, supra note 2, at 25.
N The UAW was able to secure a seat on Chrysler's board of direc-
tors, to be occupied by Douglas Fraser, UAW president in exchange for
$203 million worth of concessions. See infra notes 125,126,134,147 and
162 and accompanying text.
15. Attempts by the Airline Pilots Association to purchase United
Airlines or its corporate parent, UAL Corporation, during 1987, 1988 and
1989 represent union involvement in employee takeovers. See Hyde &
Livingston, supra note 6, at 1154-1162; Rosen, supra note 2, at 27-28;
Wall Street Journal, series of articles beginning in September, 1989 through
December, 1989.
16. 'The transference of economic ownership to workers ... is by
itself irrelevant, and is at best a means to an end. That end is not owner-
ship, but control: the extension of democracy to the production process
and the elimination of artificial inequality' Kaufman, supra note 7, at 825
citing J. Rifkin & R. Barber, The North Will Rise Again: Pen-
sions, Politics & Power in the 1980's 83 (1978).
17. J. Grossman, William Sylvis: Pioneer of American
Labor; A Study of the Labor Movement During the Era of the
Civil War 189 (1945).
18. Id. at 190 (The molders had spent a million and a half dollars
on strikes with no permanent gain during the years 1859-1869).
19. However, William Sylvis was not at the forefront of the coopera-
tive movement. Cooperatives had existed for several years prior to his
advocation: the Philadelphia House Carpenters of 1791; the cordwainers
of 1806; and, the Rochdale Society's cooperative system, started in 1844
are a few of the earlier attempts. Id. at 193-199.
20. J. Grossman, supra note 17, at 200.
21. Id. at 204-206.
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id. at 208-9.
24. G. Grob, Workers and Utopia; A Study of Ideologi-
cal Conflict in the American Labor Movement 37 (1961).
25. Id. at 37.
26. L.Heckscher, Democracy at Work. In Whose Interest,
188-199 (Jan. 1981). The Politics of Worker Participation. (Thesis, avail-
able from Dept. of Sociology, Harvard University).
27. Id. at 118.
28. NLRA §§ 1-19; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) (declaring as the policy
of the United States:
[the] eliminat[ion] [of] the causes of certain substantial ob-
structions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of associa-
tion, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and con-
ditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection).
29. NLRA §8(a)(5); 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(5) (making it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "refuse to bargain collectively with the represen-
tatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(ar) and
§8(b)(3); 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(3) (making it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization 'to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provid-
ed it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of
section 9(a)").
30. NLRA §9(a); 29 U.S.C. §159(a).
31. 452 U.S. 666, 669 (1981) (holding that an employer does not
have a duty to bargain in good faith over its decision to close a part of
its business).
32. R. Stem & R. O'Brien, National Unions and Employee Owner-
ship (May 1977) (unpublished manuscript available from Cornell Univer-
sity) (summarizing the content of letters received from research directors
and officers of forty-nine national unions in response to an inquiry on their
policies toward worker ownership of firms).
33. Id. at 6; see Slott, supra note 8, at 93 ('fW]orker ownership
divert[s] workers' activity into projects which will either fail economically
or be coopted by the system, they don't strength labor. Worse, they can
be an additional source of disunity for working class already hampered
by sexual, racial and occupational divisions")-
34. P. Pitegoff, Unions and Worker Ownership 2 Policy Studies
Journal (forthcoming publication).
35. See Ronan, supra note 12.
36. The Employee Cooperative Corporations Act, MASS. GEN
LAWS ANN. ch. 157A (West 1982). See Ellerman & Pitegoff, supra note
13.
37. Employee Ownership Assistance Act, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48
§§ 1303-1313 (Smith-Hurd 1984-1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.751 (West 1984); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1801(11)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1983); Delaware Employee Ownership Act, DEL CODE ANN. tit.
29, § 6508 (1981); Employee Ownership Assistance Act of 1982, 1982
Cal. Legis. Serv. 8244 (West); MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 Art. 41 § 14J
(Repl. Vol. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 40 (Michie/Law, Co-
op. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 162-L2 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27 H-90 (West 1984-85 Supp.); See, eg. Duquet, supra note 3; Mober-
ly, New Directions in Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining, 87
W.Va.L.Rev. 765 (Summ. 1985).
38. See supra notes 12-14 for examples.
39. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 2.
40. Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership, 5 Wis.L.Rev.
731, 759 (1982).
41. W. Whyte, supra note 1, at 96.
42. Redmon, supra note 12, at 5.
43. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 82.
44. Id. at 81.
45. Id. at 87 (stating that the deferred 1975 payments were not met
in 1978. The union agreed to postpone one more year. Payments on the
1978 and 1979 pension obligations, however, were never made either).
46. Redmon, supra note 12, at 5-6.
47. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 88.
48. See id. at 89 (for the specifics of the consultant's recommen-
dations.).
49. Id. at 89-90.
50. Rosen, Kline, & Young, How Employee Ownership Plans Work
in Employee Ownership in America: The Equity Solution
(1986) [hereinafter EO in America].
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51. Redmon, supra note 12, at 10.
52. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 94; W. Whyte, supra note 1, at 97.
53. W. Whyte, supra note 1, at 98-99 (Since there was no candi-
date at the time, existing management continued until the election of Her-
bert Einstein in 1981).
54. Id. at 100.
55. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 94. Although the specifics of the
Local's Agreement and its incorporation of the Master Agreement are in-
teresting, the import is the protection of industry-wide standards. A com-
mon criticism of employee buy-outs is that they have occurred as part
of a concession deal. Concession bargaining undermines union standards
and hurts other workers in the rest of the labor movement See Slott, supra
note 8, at 87.
56. Basically this trust would have avoided many of the ESOP regu-
lations and would have held in trust employees' stock given in exchange
for their wage deductions. See Olson, supra note 40, at 756, n.137 (detailing
the specifics of the proposed trust plan).
57. ERISA §406(3); 29 U.S.C. §1106(e) (prohibits transactions be-
tween plan and party in interest if... (e) acquisition on behalf of the plan,
or any employer security or real property is in violation of §1107(a) of
this section.). ERISA §407(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. §1107(a)(2) ('A plan may not
acquire any qualifying employer security or qualifying employer real property,
if immediately after such acquisition the aggregate fair market value of
the plan exceeds 10 percent of the fair market value of the assets of the
plan.")
58. Olson, supra note 40, at 755-756.
59. Redmon, supra note 12, at 7.
60. ESOP structure is established in accordance with legislative res-
trictions in a written agreement negotiated between the selling manage-
ment, union or nonunion representatives and financiers. See ERISA
§§407-08; 29 U.S.C. §§1107-08 (1987). Furthermore, ESOPs are exempted
from ERISA §406; 29 U.S.C. §1106 prohibited transactions. ERISA
§408(b); 29 U.S.C. §1108(b).
61. Redmon, supra note 12, at 6.
62. The written plan validating the ESOP must provide for the es-
tablishment of an Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT). The ESOT
is formed to hold all the assets of the ESOP.
63. Redmon, supra note 12, at 8.
64. The ESOP plan details which employees participate in the ESOP,
thus which employees can vote ERISA §102(b); 29 U.S.C. §1022(b). O-
son, supra note 40, at 757 (Raths ESOP agreement specified that all bar-
gaining unit employees are to participate in the ESOP and nonbargaining
unit employees may participate).
65. See Democratic ESOP, supra note 12.
66. Since shares of stock can be issued in accordance with levels
of wages, managerial employees tend to have a greater number of shares.
Thus, it is important to have a one vote per person basis rather than a
one vote per share basis.
67. Olson, supra note 40, at 758 (citing Rath Packing Company Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plan Prospectus (Dec. 10, 1982) at App. B-3).
68. Id. at 758.
69. See Kaufman, supra note 7, at 829 (ERISA and I.R.C. Regula-
tions required that every employee benefits plan be established and main-
tained through a written instrument which provides 'for one or more named
fiduciaries who ... shall have authority to control and maintain the oper-
ation and administration of the plan.")
70. EO in America, supra note 50, at 105-106.
71. Id. at 104.
72. Olson, supra note 40, at 104.
73. EO in America, supra note 50, at 104.
74. Id. at 104.
75. Olson, supra note 40, at 760. But see Redmon, supra note 2,
at 6 (Late in 1982 Rath found itself $38 million behind in its payments
to its employees' pension funds, and Rath management took extreme ac-
tion: the pension plans were terminated, affecting over 6,000 people)
76. Redmon, supra note 12, at 11-12 (In 1979, deferrals amounted
to $4,000 per person. These deferrals were continued from 1979 to 1983).
77. Redmon, supra note 12, at 20.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Redmon, supra note 12, at 7, 14.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 17.
82. Rosen, supra note 2, at 11.
83. Id. at 60-61.
84. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 12.
85. Swinney, supra note 8, at 104.
86. Id. at 104.
87. Pitegoff and Lynd, Workers Can Be Choosers, New York Times,
October 27, 1982.
88. See Swinney, supra note 8, at 104 ('Worker ownership Is not
a good tactic when: proposed by a company as an effort to get the wor-
kers to finance the closing of a plant which has been milked dry and would
have no viable future under any owner; proposed by a company as an
effort to liquidate or neutralize the union; the company is not capable of
surviving in the marketplace; and, the workers are not capable of running
the plantf.)
89. Guidelines Help Unions Assess ESOPs, AFLCIO News, August
22, 1987.
90. ERISA §404(A); 29 U.S.C. §1104(A).
91. Rosen, supra note 2, at 42 (stating that according to a 1985
ESOP Association survey of its membership (236 companies respond-
ed), only 7 percent had converted a pension plan into an ESOP and 34
percent had a pension plan in addition to their ESOP).
92. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 3 (noting several consequential uses
that have arisen, which may incidentally hurt employees. Revelant among
those noted are: replacing pension plans or other employee benefit pro-
grams, so as to retain cash that otherwise would be permanently Invest-
ed in the other programs and recouping cash in an existing benefit plan
by converting it to an ESOP which uses its assets to buy stock from the
company).
93. Guidelines Help Unions Assess ESOPs, supra note 89; see Ball,
supra note 12, at 11 (The United Steelworkers of America, one of the
few unions with an active program of support for employee-ownership
initiatives, strongly states in its resolution on ESOPs that:
ESOPs must never be used as a substitute for an adequate,
properly funded pension plan guaranteed by the Federal Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). The basic retirement Incomes
of our members must not depend on the solvency of any single
business enterprise in a free market economy. (Emphasis added).)
94. P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 6.
95. Hoerr, ESOPs: Revolution or Ripoff?, Bus. Week, April 15,1985
at 95.
96. G. Hansen & F. Adams, ESOPs, Unions and The Rank
and File 9 (1989) (available from the Industrial Cooperative Association).
97. Farrell, Hoerr, Employee Ownership: Is It Good for You? Or Your
Company?, Business Week, May 15, 1989 at 119.
98. Democratic ESOP supra note 12, at 7 (The 1986 Tax Reform
Act provides express authorization for this model). See I.R.C. §409(e)(5);
26 U.S.C. §408(e)(5)(1987).
99. Democratic ESOR supra note 12, at 6-8 (discussing the two
democratic voting structures that can be devised within an ESOP).
100. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 841-842.
101. Id. at 842.
102. See ICA Report on Worker Education Efforts (1984) (for descrip-
tions of some worker education efforts by C. Turner and a call for a new
pedagogy for democratic labor-based education by F. Adams).
103. Putterman, Some Behavioral Perspectives on the Dominance
of Hierarchical Over Democratic Forms of Enterprise, 3 J. of Econ. Be-
hay. & Organization 140 (1982).
104. Philadelphia Assoc. Cooperative Enterprises, Union Role In Em-
ployee Ownership (memo on file with author) (hereinafter PACE),
105. See infra text accompanying notes 110116 (discussing unions'
role as an institutionalized legitimate opposition).
106. See P. Pitegoff, supra note 34, at 9 (indicating that many wor-
ker owned companies supplement the ownership structure with other
mechanisms for employee participation and influence in order to estab.
lish a more democratic company).
107. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 842 (citing J. Simmons & W.
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Mares, Working Together 256 (1983)).
108. Hansen & Adams, supra note 96, at 10.
109. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Ca, 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
110. Kaufman, supra note 7, at 842; Ellerman, The Legitimate Op-
position at Work: The Union's Role in Large Democratic Firms, ICA (April
1986).
111. Hansen & Adams, supra note 96, at 9.
112. PACE, supra note 104 citing Sklar, An Experiment in Worker
Ownership, Dissent 61-69 (Winter 1982) quoting Chuck Mueller, from
UFCW Local 46 at Rath Packing Company:
My picture of the union in all of this is to watch out for the
individual. Because there's always one guy that's got a grievance
that everybody else couldn't care less about. So he's gotta have
some protection; and the union is the only thing I see will do
it ... A personnel director could do it, but I haven't seen many
[i]f [sic] em who will. They won't buck the corporation for one guy.
113. PACE, supra note 104.
114. See Smith, The Labor Movement and Worker Ownership, 2 So-
cial Report (Boston College) (Smith, as assistant to the President of the
United Steelworkers of America sets forth six fairly conventional func-
tions for unions in worker owned enterprises, the following two are the
most relevant to this paper 3) negotiating and enforcing equitable arrange-
ments for promotion, demotion, layoff, recall, prevention of unfair discipline,
the structure of wage relationships, and other working conditions problems
and 5) establishing and enforcing safe and healthful working conditions,
and informing workers on workplace hazards).
115. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 158-160.
116. See E. Greenberg, Workplace Democracy: The Polit-
ical Effects of Participation 84-88 (1986) (noting the serious lack
of workplace safety in the Plywood Cooperatives, a nonunionized wor-
ker cooperative).
117. C. Gunn, supra note 12, at 74 (Positing eleven fundamentals
that are essential to worker ownership. I have chosen the following fun-
damentals which must be recognized and committed to in order for un-
ions' to elevate their role in promoting worker ownership as a method of
economic reform which serves the interests of workers:
1) Control and management of the enterprise is the right
of all people who work at it, and this right is based on their work
role, not on any stipulation of capital ownership. Management
is based on direct and/or representative democracy and equality
of voting power among all who work in the enterprise
2) Income earned by the enterprise after payment of all costs
and taxes, belongs to those who work for it.
7) A participatoryidemocratic consciousness within the en-
terprise is essential, and educational emphasis on the philosophy
and practice of workers' self-management should reinforce this
set of attitudes and values.
8) All information must be available to all enterprise mem-
bers, and managerial expertise must be shared and disseminat-
ed as fully as possible.
9) The enterprise must assure individual rights corresponding
to basic political liberties to members within the firm.
10) An internal but independent judiciary must be capable
of action to settle disputes over infractions of rules, enforce bas-
ic rights, and protect the by-laws of the enterprise).
118. Ellerman, supra note 110, at 7.
119. Id. at 15.
120. But see Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 62 Minn.L.Rev. 265 (1975)
(discussing the rejection of the collective bargaining model altogether as
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121. See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text (arguing the
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122. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31; United Technolo-
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1982) [hereinafter Economic and Legal].
124. Id. at 925.
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tributed to Economic and Legal, supra note 123.
128. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("It is
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not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and con-
duct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of share-
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poration to a university, stating explicitly that Individual shareholders whose
private interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the plaintiff corpora-
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